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Women, peace and security and the DRC: Time to rethink wartime sexual violence as gender based violence?
Introduction
Numerous feminist studies have highlighted the extensive violence and insecurity that women experience during armed conflicts and transition (Ní Aoláin, Haynes and Cahn 2011) . Women, in conflicts around the world, are killed, mutilated, tortured, imprisoned, raped, kidnapped, trafficked, sold into slavery, forced into prostitution, displaced, dispossessed and impoverished. In addition to direct violence, conflicts typically exacerbate structural forms of violence and heighten economic hardship, a phenomenon often termed by feminists as economic violence (True, 2012; Mertus, 2003) .
Women, particularly those who have lost their male relatives, are more likely to be dispossessed and stripped of lands and properties. Displacement in particular, pushes women deeper into poverty, insecurity and exploitation (UNHCR 2014; Giles 2013) . Conflicts tend to reinforce already existing patriarchal structures and exacerbate gender discrimination . Women particularly during post-conflict transition often suffer from exclusion from decision making and experience a backlash against their rights (Aroussi 2015; Pankhurst, 2007; Al-Ali 2005) . While women are involved during conflicts in war and peacemaking efforts and in managing the survival of their communities they are typically excluded from participating in formal peace negotiations, transitional and future government's institutions and from the reconstruction programmes (Aroussi 2015) . The harm of exclusion magnifies women's experiences of gender harm and sustains women's subaltern status in transitional societies. Various feminist scholars have also highlighted the continuum of gender harm in which women live in peace, conflict and post-conflict societies and the interconnectedness between the various forms of violence (True 2012; Enloe 2010; Cockburn 2004) .
Feminists have constantly pointed out to the organic link between women's lack of access to decision making and resources such as lands, properties, credit, employment, education and their vulnerability to violence during conflicts and in the so called "peace time" (Aroussi 2015; True 2012; Haynes, And Cahn 2011).
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However, while gender harm in conflicts is extensive, during the past two decades we have witnessed an unprecedented narrow focus on sexual harm in international law, diplomacy and policy making arenas. This has been particularly the case within the United Nations Security Council's agenda on women, peace and security (WPS). The UN agenda started with the adoption of resolution 1325 in October 2000. This resolution represented the first instance in which the UN Security Council recognised women beyond the category of victims as political actors and essential partners capable of contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security. The resolution introduced a holistic agenda to address the needs of women in armed conflicts, peace processes and post-conflict reconstruction and to involve and support women's participation in all their peace activities (Aroussi 2015) . However, since June 2008, the UN Security Council adopted a series of new resolutions on women, peace and security that almost exclusively focus on the issue of sexual violence in armed conflicts. These are resolutions 1820 (2009); 1888 (2009), 1960 (2010) and 2106 (2013) . In this article, I argue that this narrowing of the agenda adopted by resolution 1325 from women's participation and empowerment to women's as victims of conflicts along with the preoccupation with addressing sexual violence as a weapon of war instead of the myriads of gender harms have had a detrimental impact on countries experiencing or emerging from conflict. In particular, I argue that the emphasis on sexual harm has obscured the extent and multiplicity of women's suffering and led to the de-prioritisation of women's other needs during the transition. In this article, I look particularly at the East of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to study how the increasing focus on sexual violence has impacted on women in this region. This article is based on extensive fieldwork conducted in the summer of 2015 in the area of South Kivu using in-depth interviews, participant observations, focus groups and informal discussions with 84 participants including survivors of sexual violence, members of communities, community and religious leaders as well as with other stakeholders including government officials, legal and health professionals, staff of international organisations and members of various local NGOs. To avoid to continuously referring to my sources in countless endnotes as "author's confidential interview and field observations" I have made the decision to only reference open sources. Hence, this article should be read with the understanding that any information, which is not referenced in the text, is based on confidential fieldwork materials, interviews, field observations 3 and informal conversations. The first section of this article starts by examining the issue of sexual violence and how it has been framed within the agenda on women, peace and security. In its second section, the article discusses the Eastern DRC as a case study. In doing this, the article first examines how the sexual violence frame was used to shape the priorities and contour of international peacebuilding efforts in the DRC. The article then moves to discuss the relative progress achieved through the international emphasis on the question of sexual harm and highlight limitations of the sexual frame in driving and shaping the international agenda on the ground. The final section of the article closes with concluding reflections.
Sexual violence and the UN agenda on women, peace and security
During conflicts, the vulnerable civilian population and particularly, women and girls, are targeted for sexual violence. While most studies of wartime sexual violence relates to conflicts where sexual violence was thought to be widespread, crimes of sexual violence are committed in all types of conflicts all around the world (Cohen and Nordas 2014) . It is however the case that, in most these studies, we find staggering lacks of reliable quantitative data on the extent of this problem during conflicts and in their aftermaths (Cohen and Nordas 2014) . Sexual violence has detrimental physical, psychological, economic and social consequences for the victims, their families and communities that persist for decades. Survivors are often left suffering from sexual traumas, including irreparable vaginal tearing, fistulas, uterine problems, infertility as well as other physical injuries sustained during the attacks caused by bullets, machete and severe beatings. Sexually transmitted infections (STIs) including with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) are also common in raped victims. In many countries where HIV is prevalent, the rate of infections among soldiers and armed militia groups is generally high (Ba et.al. 2008) . Hence, when troops and armed rebels engage in the rapes and sexual exploitation of the civilian population, the risk of infection with HIV transmission is much greater particularly when injuries such as vaginal fistulae and trauma are inflicted on the genital area (DeLargy 2013; Supervie, Halima, and Blower 2010) . The psychological and mental health consequences of sexual violence are unfathomable and often intergenerational (WHO 2012) . Those family and community members who are made to watch the violence are also at a considerable risk of psychological damage. The social consequences of sexual violence are significant. Victims of rape 4 are commonly disowned by their families, young and unmarried girls are typically considered as 'spoiled' and children born out of rape are very often rejected by the community. This is especially true given that the stigma and shame associated with rape in peacetime continues during conflicts even in cases where sexual violence is widespread. Sexual violence has also profound economic consequences condemning its victims to a life of poverty and increased vulnerability. The economic aspect of sexualised violence is complex but often overlooked. Pillage, extortions and dispossessions are frequently committed alongside rapes. Expensive medical treatments required for victims of rape typically result a spiral of debts. When victims are rejected by their spouses and communities and unmarried girls are no longer considered as worthy of marriage by suitors they generally lose all forms of actual or potential financial support. All of these factors compounded deepen the poverty and lead to the destitution of victims and their families.
Sexual violence is undoubtedly one of the key issues on the UN agenda on women, peace and security from its inception. Resolution 1325 (2000, para 10 and 11) recognises that women are being targeted for sexual violence and requires, member states and all those involved in peace activities to protect women from sexual violence and to prosecute those responsible for crimes of sexual violence against women and girls. However, resolution 1325 was initially widely celebrated by feminists and women's activists because of its potential for transforming gender unequal relationships in transitional societies and increasing women's equal participation and full involvement particularly at leadership positions in national, regional and international institutions and in future governance and transitional institutions. The underlying aim of resolution 1325 was not simply to protect women during armed conflicts but to promote gender equality and women's empowerment during peace processes and postconflict reconstruction (Aroussi 2015; Otto 2009 (Resolution 1888 (Resolution 2009 Resolution 1960 2010, para 3, 4, 7 and 18) . By flexing its muscles to pursue and punish the perpetrators, the Security Council has reinvigorated and re-invented the agenda on WPS into hard core peace and security (Aroussi 2015) .
While the reframing of sexual violence as a peace and security concern, may have resulted in Member
States taking more beefy responses against the perpetrators, it did create a false distinction between sexual violence committed as a weapon of war and everyday sexual and gender based violence during conflicts and transition (Grewal 2010 The conflicts in the DRC have significantly impacted on women's health. For instance, DRC has one of the highest fertility rates globally and a limited access to reproductive health (Kidman, Palermo and Bertrand 2015) . As mentioned earlier, health facilities in the region lack basic supplies and usually require patients to purchase the materials needed for the medical intervention such as soap, gloves, a razor blade and a sheet, to ensure a clean delivery (UNFPA 2011). As a result, the country is fifth globally in terms of maternal mortality which accounts for half of all female deaths between the age of 15 and 49 (WHO 2015 (WHO , 2014 UNFPA 2011) . These figures are at the national level but in the East of the country, the situation would be much worse due to the limited health infrastructure and investment.
Sexual violence has been a defining feature of conflicts in the DRC since the beginning of the Congo global war (Autesserre 2012) . Sexual violence, in the DRC, was committed by all armed groups including government forces as a way to intimidate and punish communities for their real or perceived collaborations with the opposing armed factions (Meger 2010) . Often sexual violence by armed perpetrators is committed alongside looting (Bartel et.al. 2013 ). Many victims were repeatedly attacked and subjected to sexual violence and loss of their loved ones before they finally decided to leave their homes and lands (Autesserre 2010, 2) . Yet sexual violence in the DRC is not only limited to armed groups, but is also widely committed by civilians as a crime of opportunity (Meger 2013) and within families including by intimate partners (Paterman, Palermo and Bredenkamp 2011). The continuous conflicts in the DRC have also exacerbated prostitution and underage sexual exploitation.
Women and young girls are pushed to the sex trade due to limited economic opportunities and rejection by their communities and stigma in cases of victims of rape (Notar 2006) . As a result, illegal brothels mushroomed in the East of the DRC and street prostitution is particularly rife. While sexual violence is widespread in the DRC, attitudes to rape and raped victims remain very stigmatising. The 10 idea that rape is the worst fate for women and that raped victims are unmarriageable is widely adhered to and the situation is worse for unmarried victims of rape including children who become seen as worthless. During the course of this research in South Kivu, victims of rape were very frequently described as worthless, damaged or destroyed with no future or prospect by their own parents and communities.
The sexual violence frame in the DRC
While sexual violence is undeniably a major issue in the DRC, it is neither the only priority for women nor a new or unprecedented phenomenon in the Congo. In fact, as Autessere (2012, but also impact on how and which issues gets addressed in peacebuilding strategies. This is particularly so, given that international peacebuilding practices are largely driven by the propensity for uncomplicated narratives and simple solutions (Autesserre 2012 (Autesserre , 2010 ).
In the case of the Congo, the simple narrative of rape as a weapon of war and ending impunity as the way to combat it has been predominant in the analyses, reports, policies and programmes on the 
The limitations of the Sexual violence frame
Despite all the progress discussed above, the focus on sexual violence did not really deliver in the case of the Eastern DRC. The framing of sexual violence as a weapon of war and the emphasis on ending impunity has mainly resulted in militaristic and legalistic strategies that did not adequately address the problem of sexual harm let alone the broader gender harm that women experience in the pending trials are often set free for lack of resources and those convicted almost never fully serve their sentences. Corruption is also rife in prisons and the criminal justice system generally. The level of corruption has led to an absence of trust in the fairness of the system and discouraged the population from using it. The state is currently unwilling to combat corruption within the criminal justice system, given that many of the corrupt judges and magistrates are not suspended even following evidence of corruption and malpractice.
As mentioned briefly earlier, the cost of pursuing justice often reverts back to the victims. A leading member of the civil society explained how
Even in cases where legal aid is provided, costs for transport and accommodation of the victim and her legal representative to the tribunal where the trial is taking place, administrative fee to lodge the case, cost of collecting medical and forensic evidence and even the cost of printing the defence report have to be covered by the vistim or a supporting NGO.
Participants in the research also repeatedly mentioned that the issue of reparation in the DRC remains untouched not only due to destitution or lack of state's funds but also because of the cost associated with the process. To claim reparations ordered by courts, victims reportedly have to travel to Kinshasa and to pay for a legal representative and administrative fees, the cost of which goes beyond the awarded value of the reparation. Hence, the awarding of reparation by the state in the case of the DRC remains meaningless.
The efforts by Congolese government to address the issue of impunity for sexual violence remained largely cosmetic. For instance, while the Congolese government is currently attempting to co-ordinate efforts by actors on the ground on ending impunity for sexual violence in the region, it is unwilling to contribute funds across the ministries to this project. The presidential appointment of Madame Janine
Mabunda as the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Kinshasa, over 1500 miles away from the East where sexual violence is widespread, has been unsurprisingly ineffective on the ground.
Prosecution by the government military courts rarely targets the high ranking Congolese army officers who continue to enjoy impunity (MONUSCO 2014) . There has been also almost no efforts to prosecute members of the armed groups due to the lack of State authority in the remote areas where these usually operate. The fact that most perpetrators whether civilians or military are at large makes victims reluctant to come forward for fear of retaliation by the perpetrators (MONUSCO 2014).
The situation of victims in terms of access to justice has been made worse by the recent decision by the government to abolish the traditional justice system with immediate effect in 2013 and to establish instead eight peace tribunals in the vast and inaccessible territory of the South Kivu. 4 These tribunals have no competence over criminal matters such as sexual violence and are not fully established yet.
All of this has meant that justice has become even more removed from the victims.
In their efforts to enhance access to justice international actors have funded several mobile courts in At the same time, the large influx of international actors willing to fund mobile courts, brought with it the usual problems associated with donor led justice and particularly economic opportunism, competition over funding, duplication of programmes and a complete lack of co-ordination. It has also led to a situation where Congolese actors would not participate in training, hearings and workshops without financial inducements. The significant amount of money provided by donors for the treatment of each case of sexual violence, has also created a false sense of progress due to increase in the number of prosecuted cases but not of attitudes within the criminal justice system and behaviours within societies in relations to gender based and sexual violence.
The sexual violence frame in the DRC in donor led justice initiatives and peacebuilding programmes has also resulted in a hierarchy of harm with rape as a weapon of war being the ultimate and most urgent priority. This is highly problematic in a country where access to services including health and justice is largely provided by donors. In this gendered paradigm victims of rape particularly by armed actors have higher chances of getting medical treatments and benefiting from legal aid and access to justice than other victims. A multiple level hierarchy operates here between militarised and nonmilitarised sexual harm, sexual and non-sexualised harm as well as between male and female victims.
The prioritisation of sexual violence in mobile courts trials according to many participants has created a sense of frustration on the ground and within communities where you have intractable conflicts over lands and resources, cases of violence murders and dispossession and no recourse to justice or conflict resolution mechanisms to resolve these issues. In such a case, the prioritisation of by certain donors of sexual violence cases through mobile courts created a sense of frustration on the ground as people would not feel that their priorities are being addressed. In a similar way, the provision of free healthcare treatments and other services to victims of sexual violence as many participants have argued is also problematic. In a country where most of the population are living below the breadline and where access to healthcare is at a premium, the provision of free medical treatments to rape related sexual injuries but not for other health conditions creates a hierarchy between patients based on sexual and non-sexual violations rather than on health emergencies and needs. The condition to identify oneself as victims of rape to benefit from services is also problematic for many women who do not wish to disclose the details of what happened to them and may discourage them from seeking treatment in the first place.
Despite all the efforts and donor's expenditure, the vastness of the territory in South Kivu and the absence of infrastructure meant that survivors are often unable to reach medical facilities such as Panzi for medical treatments and psycho-social assistance. The endemic nature of rape in the DRC has also meant that the vast majority of victims will not have access to western led initiative of transitional justice (MONUSCO 2014). In the absence of neutral and functioning constabulary, police force, prison system, and judiciary and absence of state's authority and institutions it is very difficult to see how justice as prosecution can be delivered and the rule of law upheld in the Eastern DRC (Lemarchand 2010, 125) . For instance, in a typical response one of the survivors in answer to a question about the kind of justice that she wants stated: These findings resonate with the view of participants from civil societies organisations who insisted that economic remedies and development oriented strategies that benefit and empower women to overcome victimisation and vulnerability in general is what is needed in the DRC. Yet donors responses remain focused on sexual violence and on criminal prosecutions and on the victims rather than more broadly on their families and communities.
The prioritisation of rape in the DRC in international programming has also inadvertently increased the stigma surrounding it. The increased attention to rape has amplified and elevated the status of rape above all other crimes and as a consequence increased its power to destroy its victims. Such power does not come from the physical act itself but rather from the symbol and value that societies and the international community attach to women's sexuality and the female body. In south Kivu, despite all the awareness campaigns organised by various organisations, men remain less likely to accept and support raped wives or girlfriends than in the case of sister, mother or daughter and the stigma surrounding victims remain significantly high (Kelly et.al. 2012) . Many civil societies' activists who participated in this study, pointed out that segregating rapes from other crimes was not helpful for the 20 country to recover from the legacy of the conflicts and to address the issue of sexual violence. Instead, they have insisted on the need for solutions that target whole communities and in-turn would benefit victims of sexual violence as members of these communities without segregating them. 
22
The focus of international NGOs on sexual violence and the competition over funds created by donors' interest in sexual violence according to many civil society's activists has only led to short term programmes and narrow scope of interventions that did not deliver at the end.
Concluding thoughts
I started the article by arguing that the increasing focus on sexual violence within the UN agenda on WPS particularly since the adoption of resolution 1820 has detracted from the broader focus on gender issues and women's empowerment espoused by resolution 1325 on the ground. While, in the last two years, there have been attempts within the agenda on women, peace and security to refocus the interest on women's participation and to re-steer international efforts toward gender empowerment and women's rights including through the recent adoption of resolution 2242 in 2015, it remains to be seen whether and how these efforts would be translated into peacebuilding practices and programmes on the ground.
I have argued in this article that, the international community's obsession with women's sexual security, at the expense of broader interest in gender security, as presented in the case of the DRC, had detrimental consequences in terms of interventions in the field. In particular, the framing of rape as a weapon of war has limited current international responses to militaristic and legalistic strategies that are incapable of eradicating sexual violence and empowering women to move beyond their sanctioned roles as victims. Sexual violence particularly in the case of the Congo is not only a weapon of war but an extensive social harm that goes beyond the artificial distinction between war and peace. Social harm necessarily requires social forms of interventions based on broader social transformation strategies aimed at combatting gender inequality and violence against women and buttressing prosocial behaviours. Legal responses on the other hand typically narrow the lens of intervention to the perpetrators away from the social norms and behaviours that allowed for violence and human rights abuses to be committed and sustained in the first place and, as a result, limit the potential for social repair. As Weinstein (2014, 175) While the priorities of survivors in the DRC and their perceptions of justice are often framed in terms of economic empowerment and development, donors and international actors remain fixated on funding and delivering justice as prosecution. Spivak (1988) has once interrogated "the unquestioned muting of the subaltern women" and the need to rethink the position of the western elites in their attempts to define and respond to third world women's problems. Spivak (1994) pointed out that the subaltern can be neither heard nor read. Perhaps if scholars, practitioners and donors start listening to those affected women and give them the space and the opportunity to speak in their own language about their issues and priorities then we would become more effective in designing responses to their suffering. Only by doing so, we would be able to confront our own blind spots in theory and practice and move beyond simplistic framing, analysis and solutions. The discrepancy between the needs and priorities of victims on the ground and donors led transitional justice programmes is not unique to the DRC and has been observed by many transitional justice scholars elsewhere ( Leone, Nkansah compared transitional justice mechanisms there to a "justice spaceship" phenomenon as an alien body with no relevance or link to the local context (Nkansah 2014, 117) . The meaning and methods of justice are socially constructed and local perceptions and expectation of justice cannot be set aside in favour of foreign concepts and frameworks of transitional justice. To fulfil the promise of gender justice, the agenda on WPS and international peacebuilding efforts aimed at implementing it must move beyond the strictures of international law to draw on transformative redistribution, recognition and representation remedies for women as conceptualised by Fraser (2010) . This would necessarily mean that interventions should not be only aimed at victims of sexual violence but at gender transformation within the society at large.
